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The peace process Burma/Myanmar has got a momentum since 2011, and both government 
and non-State actors put endeavor to make the process move on. This research paper is a 
comparative study of the seven-step Roadmap of National League for Democracy (NLD) and the 
seven-step Roadmap of previous military junta State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). The 
military junta tactfully reached the seventh step Roadmap and strictly holds on to the 2008 
Constitution. It guaranteed the Tatmadaw (Army) a fixed position both in politics and defense. In 
contrast, the civilian government and ethnic groups are struggling to sign a union agreement— the 
21st century Panglong Conference Agreement. This paper argues that amending the constitution in 
accordance with the union agreement and the subsequent approval of the amended constitution may 
cause tension and pressure to be dealt with by the government, the Tatmadaw and ethnic 
nationalities. If the stakeholders are capable to get the union agreement to amend the constitution, 
there will be a wider chance to build a democratic federal union as planned in the NLD’s seven-step 
road map. 
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Introduction 
        In late 2016, the government of Union of Republic of Burma/Myanmar, has announced a new 
seven-step Roadmap1 towards reaching national reconciliation and peace at the Union level in 
Burma/Myanmar. Such a roadmap was also laid out by the SPDC military regime 2003, with the 
claim that it would lead to “disciplined-flourishing democracy.”2 This article is structured to 
compare the two different Roadmaps by the SPDC and the government lead by NLD; how the steps 
in the Roadmaps have been implemented by two different authorities and what are the 
complications of the Roadmaps. The purpose of this article to clarify some of the obstacles to the 
process of the NLD’s roadmap to national reconciliation and peace in Burma/Myanmar.  
        A process of reform has been on track in Burma/Myanmar since November 2010 when a new 
military-backed civilian government replaced the military junta. However, the key institution 
driving the transition process was the military regime itself, not the traditional pro-democracy 
                                                          
1 The NLD’s roadmap consists of (i) to review the political dialogue framework (ii) to amend the political dialogue 
framework (iii) to convene the Union Peace Conference—the 21st century Panglong in accordance with the amended 
and approved political dialogue framework (iv) to sign union agreement— the 21st century Panglong Conference 
Agreement based on the results of the 21st Century Panglong Conference (v) to amend the constitution in accordance 
with the union agreement and approve the amended constitution (vi) to hold the multi-party democracy general 
elections in accordance with the amended and approved constitution (vii) to build a democratic federal union in 
accordance with the results of the multi-party democracy general elections. 
2 The seven-step roadmap announced by SPDC includes: (i) reconvening of the National Convention that has been 
adjourned since 1996; (ii) after the successful holding of the National Convention, step by step implementation of the 
process necessary for the emergence of a genuine and disciplined democratic system; (iii) drafting of a new constitution 
in accordance detailed basic principles laid down by the National Convention; (iv) adoption of the constitution through 
national referendum; (v) holding of free and fair elections for Pyithu Hluttaws (Legislative bodies) according to the new 
constitution; (vi) convening of Hluttaws attended by Hluttaw members in accordance with the new constitution., and  
(vii) building a modern, developed and democratic nation by the state leaders elected by the Hluttaw; and the 
government and other central organs formed by the Hluttaw. 
 
 
The 6th Asian Academic Society International Conference (AASIC) 
A Transformative Community: 
Asia in Dynamism, Innovation, and Globalization 
         
©Copyright 2018 proceeding of the 6th AASIC      159 
 
 
opposition and international community. Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar 
(2008) (hereafter the 2008 Constitution) have favored the regime of limited number of elites. In 
1993 they cautiously initiated the transition to safeguard their gradual withdrawal and partial 
disengagement from day-to-day politics. Since then, the process to draft a new constitution 
continued in a fourteen-year long National Convention. Against this elite regime, the prolonged 
resistance for democracy and ethnic armed conflicts have been ongoing in demand of 
consociational democracy and peace. 
        This article argues that amending the constitution in accordance with the union agreement and 
the subsequent approval of the amended constitution may cause tension and pressure to be dealt 
with by the government, the Tatmadaw and ethnic groups. Yet, if the stakeholders are capable to get 
union agreement to amend the constitution, there will be a wider chance to build a democratic 
federal union as planned in the NLD’s seven-step road map.  
 
Military Junta’s Seven-step Roadmap to Democracy 
        This section discusses how the successive military regimes have designed its seven -
step roadmap to guarantee itself as a “guardian” of the country. They did so by granting 
the military 25 percent of the seats in the parliament along with the  control of key cabinet 
posts. In August 2003, 15 years after the coup in 1988, the military junta, SPDC, had 
unveiled the “seven-step roadmap to democracy.” It was a plan to create what military 
generals called a "developed and disciplined-flourishing democracy." The plan was the 
military to exert great control over the nation.3 The SPDC had always targeted to hold a 
dual role for the military in politics and in defense, similar to Dwifungsi model4 of its 
ASEAN counterpart Indonesia.5 This roadmap served as a basis for the military junta to 
create a space to sustain military power and transform itself from De Facto 
Government to De Jure Government under the constitution. SPDC’s seven-step roadmap to 
democracy was non-inclusive and in short of timeline.6 The military junta took more than 
sixteen years to draft the 2008 Constitution in Burma/Myanmar, which was the fourth step 
of the seven-step roadmap. The NLD had walked out of the National Convention in 1995, 
thereby leaving the whole constitutional process in the hands of repressive junta. The junta 
was quite well-prepared to move forward to draft a constitution which protect its interest 
to permanently ensure military control over civilian executive and legislative bodies at all 
levels of government.7 Artfully delineated the steps of the roadmap through a new 
                                                          
3 Than, T. M. M. (2001) “Burma: The New Professionalism of the Tatmadaw,” in Alagappa, M. (ed.) Military 
Professionalism in Asia: Conceptual and Empirical Perspectives. Honolulu: East West Center, pp. 163–178; Bünte, M. 
(2011) Burma’s Transition to a “Disciplined Democracy”: Abdication or Institutionalization of Military Rule? 177. 
Humburg. Available at: http://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/system/files/publications/wp177_buente.pdf. 
 4 Dwifungsi ("dual function") was a doctrine implemented by Suharto's military-dominated "New Order" government 
in Indonesia in 1966. Dwifungsi was used to justify the military permanently increasing its influence in the Indonesian 
government, including reserved military-only seats in the parliament, and top positions in the nation's public service. 
5 Ganesan, N. (2005) “Myanmar’s Foreign Relations: Reaching Out to the World,” in Hlaing, K. Y., Taylor, R. H., and 
Than, T. M. M. (eds.) Myanmar: Beyond Politics to Societal Imperatives. Singapore: ISEAS Publications, pp. 30–55; 
Berger, B. (2014) Myanmar’s Armed Forces: The Case for Engagement, Focus Asia. 8. Stockholm. 
6 Pinheiro, Paulo Sérgio. "The Myanmar's Roadmap to the Consolidation of Military Authoritarianism." Asia Pacific 
Security Challenges. Prague Security Studies Institute.  
7 Diller, J. (1997) “The National Convention in Burma (Myanmar): An Impediment to the Restoration of Democracy,” 
in Carey, P. (ed.) Burma: The Challenge of Change in a Divided Society. 1st ed. New York: St. Martin’s Press , Inc, pp. 
27–56; Taylor, R. H. (1997) “The Constitutional Future of Myanmar in Comperative Perspective,” in Carey, P. (ed.) 
Burma: The Challenge of Change in a Divided Society. New York: St. Martin’s Press , Inc, pp. 55–69; Hlaing, K. Y. 
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constitution which was to safeguard their gradual withdrawal, the junta has manipulated 
2010 election in order to continue military dominance in the parliament by crafting 
military-backed party Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) to win the 
election. Since then, the hybrid civilian government has been convening Hluttaws (The 
Assembly of the Union) in accordance with its 2008 Constitution which was the achievement 
of the sixth step of SPDC’s “seven-step roadmap to democracy. In this delicate process, 
the military has been “caretaking” most of the political process by “transit” quasi -civilian 
government till 2015, and by saving twenty-five percent of the seats in the parliament. 
With a very systematic transition plan, as many scholars argued, the military with its 
preservation of power is the key and the essence of Burma/Myanmar political transition 
which they named “disciplined democracy” under the military’s disciplines. Among the 
glut adjectives used to describe democracy such as “authoritarian democracy”, “autocratic 
democracy”, “illiberal democracy”, the junta has reached its last step of the seven 
roadmap - what Stephen McCarthy called “military-dominated democracy” or “disciplined 
democracy.”8  
Thein Sein’s administration has been far from perfect, but soon after winning the 
seats he initiated the long-awaited peace process which could be one of his most 
successful legacies. The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) 9 initiated by Thein Sein 
government in early 2011 was construed as a vital step for peace process in 
Burma/Myanmar, because the long-lasting armed conflict between the Tatmadaw and 
EAOs is one of the major key barriers impeding development in the country.  
 
1. The Peace Process Since 2011 
        This section discusses how the hybrid government has handled the transition from fully 
military-ruling system to a more disciplined democratic government. Ethnic nationalities in 
Burma/Myanmar have been in one of the longest-running armed conflict in modern times in defense 
of their identity, and resistance against the military regime for autonomy and equal treatment. The 
core causes of ethnic grievance in Burma/Myanmar are ethnic nationalities’ lack of influence in the 
political decision-making processes and the absence of development in the country, especially in 
ethnic areas. The main objective of the peace process in the country is to establish a “union” based 
on the principles of democracy and federalism in accordance with the outcomes of political 
dialogue and in the spirit of Panglong. The Spirit consists of democratic rights, national equality 
and the right to self-determination. 
        In 2011, the basic principles of NCA and Framework for Political Dialogue (FPD) are agreed 
by the government, Tatmadaw and 16 EAOs.10 This version includes the three demands from ethnic 
nationalities: democratic rights, national equality and the right to self-determination; Lawkapala11 
Principles: liberty, equality and justice; and the Three Main National Causes of the Tatmadaw:  the 
principles of non-disintegration of the union, non-disintegration of national solidarity and 
perpetuation of national sovereignty. Since early 2011, Burma/Myanmar’s peace process, as a 
central element of political reform, received a high status in the country’s new political epoch. 
Within two years of a “new peace process,” the government reached state level ceasefire 
agreements with fourteen armed groups. By 2006, 25 groups had agreed to ceasefire with the 
                                                          
8 McCarthy, S. (2006) The Political Theory of Tyranny in Singapore and Burma: Aristotle and the Rhetoric of 
Benevolent Despotism. London: Routledge; Holliday, I. (2011) Burma Redux: Global Justice and the Quest for 
Political Reform in Myanmar. New York: Columbia University Press. 
9 The agreement was signed between the Government of the Republic of the Union of Burma/Myanmar and the EAOs 
on October 15, 2015, and unanimously ratified by the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw on December 8, 2015. 
10 Chapter 1, 1(a) of NCA and Chapter 2, 2(a) of FPD. 
11 The deterrent Principles Buddhism which guard the world from falling into chaos 
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SPDC.12 The agenda agreed in each state13 level agreement include initiative for political dialogue 
and development issues. The peace process since the U Thein Sein’s administration has got a 
momentum and both government and non-state actors including EAOs, political parties, and civil 
society groups put endeavor to make the process move on.  
When NLD won 2015 Burma/Myanmar election, the government also promises to 
establish rule of law, peace and national reconciliation in the country. Hence, the 
government is committed to carry on the peace process initiated by the previous 
government and to implement the principles and objectives of NCA and FPD. Thus, 
longtime Burma/Myanmar watchers agree that a lasting resolution of ethnic conflicts 
requires more than forging ceasefires or merely absence of war. Therefore, it will need 
further concrete measures. As agreed in union level ceasefire agreement, each step 
requires concrete measure and clear time-line. It had been under negotiation since August 
2011 until present. It is indispensable to have a peace architecture which is composed of 
process and substances. The ongoing peace process in Burma/Myanmar has not reached 
the political dialogue stage in which the political decision-making processes and social, 
economic and cultural development in the country will be discussed.  
 
2. NLD’s Roadmap for National Reconciliation and Union Peace 
   This section discusses how the NLD government continues with the peace process 
according to Chapter 5 of the NCA to guarantee political dialogue so that there can be a 
Union Accord for national reconciliation and peace.  
         The years 2016 and 2017 are marked by multiple agendas and variegated political 
interests in Burma/Myanmar, from NLD’s second time landslide election victory to the 
government’s nationwide ceasefire agreement with EAOs. Yet, the first fully civilian 
government after five decades has sundry domestic complications to handle ahead and has 
been under sustained domestic and international pressure to bring comprehensive political 
changes for the pursuit of positive peace in Burma/Myanmar. The peace process has not 
made progress in certain aspects as clashes between Tatmadaw, and EAOs continue. The 
NLD government get both support and opprobrium of the people at the same time. More 
than two years since assuming office, the NLD government has been trying to carry on the 
peace process sensibly by initiating peace process with several ethnic groups on the one 
hand, and a balanced relationship with the Tatmadaw, on the other hand. There are two 
major issues that encumbered the NLD government from carrying out its steps of roadmap 
for national reconciliation and peace in the country. First, the NLD government’s conflict 
resolution method in the case of the Rohingya Muslim community in Rakhine State has 
been the central focus of the international community. Second, the government’s 
incapability over the incessant attacks of Tatmadaw against EAOs14causes growing 
concerns of both international and domestic non-state actors.  
         The NLD government has an urgent priority to adopt policies and implement 
concrete measures to prevent outbreaks of violence both for the short and long -term. The 
party leadership, for its part, has to put grave endeavor in releasing the clear sta nces of the 
                                                          
12 Taylor, R. H. (2009). The State in Myanmar. London: Hurst & Co., pp. 433-445 
13 In the case of Burma/Myanmar, “state” has two different meaning depending on the context. The first is “state” as a 
country, and the other is a “state” referring to different ethnic area such and Kachin State and Chin State. There are 
seven states in Burma/Myanmar, namely Chin State, Kachin State, Karen State, Kayah State, Mon State, Rakhine State, 
and Shan State.  
14 The Northern Alliance is a military coalition in Burma/Myanmar composed of four ethnic insurgent groups: the 
Arakan Army (AA), the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army 
(MNDAA) and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA). Since December 2016, the Northern Alliance has been in 
fierce military confrontations with the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Armed Forces) in the towns of Muse, Mong Ko, Pang 
Hseng, Namhkam and Kutkai in Shan State 
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government on societal issues, such as condemnation of all forms of religious hatred, 
violence and hate speech, and outbreak of armed conflict, and in adopting necessary laws.  
        Soon after taking the government seats, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the State Counselor 
and head of the National Reconciliation and Peace Center, laid out a simplified seven -step 
roadmap towards reaching national reconciliation and peace. This roadmap is in fact based 
on the FPD which was negotiated and drafted by the Union Peace Dialogue Joint 
Committee (UPDJC). This revamped seven-step roadmap primarily aims to achieve the 
following objectives: to sign a peace agreement based on the results of peace conferences, 
to amend 2008 Constitution, and to build a democratic federal union.15  
        The UPDJC has initiated a review of five sectors consisting of political, social, 
economic, security, land and natural resource issues. These issues should be first 
discussed separately for each ethnic nationality in its respective st ate, because the 
problems they face vary. Then, the issues can be discussed at the launch of the national -
level political dialogue collectively. The sooner the political dialogue reaches agreement, 
the sooner the task of state building can be implemented. Since Daw Aung San Suu Kyi 
came into power, the Union Peace Conference is called the 21 st Century Panglong. So far, 
she has held three conferences.  
The challenge at this point is whether the government and the Tatmadaw really 
would be able to pave the mechanism for all EAOs to become parties to peace process so 
that all peace stakeholders would be able to focus solely on the substance – national 
reconciliation for genuine peace. Currently, the civilian government pay more attention to 
the proper relation with the Tatmadaw than taking care of ethnic political and armed 
groups. Following the OECD Evaluation Guideline to the peacebuilding, the current 
situation can be analyzed in the following ways. Up until now, there is no proper 
operational prevention (i.e. immediate measures applicable in the face of crisis), and 
structural prevention (i.e. measures to ensure that crises do not arise in the first place, or if 
they do, that they do not recur) in the peace process of Burma/Myanmar. 16 There is no 
such applications of structural or diplomatic measures to prevent tensions and disputes 
from escalating into violent conflict. Anyhow, peacebuilding should start as early as 
possible without waiting for the post-conflict17 phase. To have a political guarantee is the 
main objective of stakeholders in the peace process of Burma/Myanmar. The objective is 
to build a democratic federal union. There is an option for amending, repealing, and 
adding provision to the Constitution and laws, if the political dialogue reach to agreem ent 
and the Union Accord or Pyidaungsu Accord is ratified by Pyidaungsu Hluttaw. Civil 
society groups, political parties, and EAOs have been pushing for constitutional 
amendments even before having a peace agreement. Section 436 of the 2008 Constitution 
gives the military a veto over constitutional change.  NLD has tried to amend the 
constitution once in 2014 by petition-calling, and another time in 2015 by proposing 
changes through a constitutional amendment committee set up by former Speaker Thura U 
Shwe Mann. However, both attempts failed. Unless amending the 2008 Constitution or 
introducing a new one, the Tatmadaw will always have dominance over legislature. Hence, 
to prioritize the 2008 Constitution amendment or to sign a union agreement is still a big 
challenge. The absence of a proper constitutional reform process in turn, will hinder the 
peace agreement at the union level. The Tatmadaw has made appallingly clear in the six-
                                                          
15 Global New Light of Myanmar. "The Government’s Roadmap for National Reconciliation and Union Peace." Global 
New Light of Myanmar (Yangon), October 16, 2016, Volume 3, No.183. 
16 OECD. "Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility Improving Learning for Results." 
DAC Guidelines and Reference Series. November 2012. 
17 The term “post-conflict” itself is controversial in the case of Myanmar as while some of the EAOs are in the process 
of NCA and peace process, many EAOs are still in the battle fields.  
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point policy18 to strictly abide by the existing law and to stick with the 2008 Constitution, 
that guaranteed the military a fixed position both in politics and defense. The last two 
points of the policy is contradicted with the fifth step of NLD seven -step roadmap, to 
amend the constitution in accordance with the union agreement and approve the amended 
constitution.   
        For this reason, ethnic nationalities in Burma/Myanmar are skeptical about the 
effective cooperation between the NLD government and Tatmadaw in implementing 
Security Sector Reform (SSR), Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), 
and inclusive nationalism promotion. The aim of SSR is “the efficient and effective provision of 
state and human security within a framework of democratic governance.”19 SSR aims at improving 
safety and general welfare by establishing effective and accountable security institutions. Oversight 
of these institutions are controlled and operated by civilians that adhere to international human 
rights.  For EAOs, DDR is simply giving up their weapon as there is a political guarantee 
that they are reintegrated as civilians into society and  can become active participants in 
the peace process. The assimilation and absorption of the linguistic, social, and cultural 
values of the ethnic nationalities and also their role in politics has made the ethnic 
nationalities to make a trust fall.20  
Ethnic groups, especially the EAOs have accepted SSR as an indispensable part of 
the peacebuilding process. SSR concerns the legal and/or political framework, 
management and capacities and systems of government, mechanism for interaction among 
security actors, and culture of service. Starting to discuss SSR even before political 
dialogue can be a good initiative to adjust peace dialogue framework. The primary concern 
of both signatory and non-signatory EAOs of NCA is whether state security institution 
serve the people. Currently the Tatmadaw controls security management and oversight 
bodies as well as justice and law enforcement institutions  such as defense, law 
enforcement, correction, and intelligence services, as well as the institutions responsible 
for border management, customs, and civil emergencies. “National Defense and Security 
Council” serving as the highest authority in the Government of Burma/Myanmar, is 
dominantly in the hand of the commander-in-chief of the Tatmadaw through appointment 
of six out of the eleven members in the council. The relationship between the Tatmadaw 
and EAOs will be a central issue in SSR. The role of Tatmadaw is not about whether it 
should be political or apolitical, but how much and what kind o f law. The involvement of 
the military in politics can range from having influence on policy making to running direct 
military rule. Until or unless security issues are addressed at the outset of peace 
implementation, and only if the SSR is linked to broad national reform agenda, political 
dialogue will be dynamic and perked up. Resolving problems with existing understanding 
of nation-building process and SSR should be the very first agenda in the Union Peace 
Conference, which is the third step of the 2016 Roadmap.  
        DDR could be used as a tool for a broader SSR. In the present Burma/Myanmar 
peace process, it is totally uncertain that conventional DDR program will avail to support 
stability and reconciliation. EAOs in Burma/Myanmar have regarded DDR with great 
suspicion as the history has daunted them that disarmament without a comprehensive 
                                                          
18 The six-points policy of the Tatmadaw are (i) to have a keen desire to reach eternal peace, (ii) to keep 
promises agreed to in peace deals, (iii) to avoid capitalizing on the peace agreement, (iv) to avoid placing 
a heavy burden on local people, (v) to strictly abide by the existing laws, and  (vi) to march towards a 
democratic country in accord with the 2008 Constitution.  
19 Hänggi, H. (2004) “Conceptualizing Security Sector Reform and Reconstruction,” in Reform and Reconstruction of 
the Security Sector. Berlin: Lit Verlag, p. 3. 
20 Taylor, L. (1922). Ethnological and Linguistic Research in Burma and South-Asia. Journal of Burma Research 
Society, 12(1), 1–13. 
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political settlement leads to grievances. Until now EAOs prefer not to focus on 
disarmament yet, because there is no political guarantee in the country that the Tatmadaw 
will not attack them again. The lesson that disarmament would be a big mistake without 
having a genuine peace agreement is learnt by an EAOs. It is worth considering reversing 
DDR into RDD (Reintegration, Disarmament, and Demobilization), which is currently 
referred to as ‘third generation DDR’.21 This procedure begins by providing both economic 
and political incentives for reintegration and only ends with some form of disarmament or 
arms control.22 Social and economic reintegration of armed combatants  is actually a 
significant concern of EAOs as that would address their grievances or ‘root causes’ for 
their taking up arms in the first place. A political dialogue can happen only when  trust 
building and reconciliation initiative takes place through democratic-friendly development 
projects. Concentrating more on actual delinquencies on the ground would speed up 
peacebuilding. Henceforward, there is a big question mark on whether the stakeholders 
leaped basic stages without addressing the root causes of conflicts in Burma/Myanmar.  
        The contested peace process in Burma/Myanmar is impeded on multiple fronts. The 21st 
Panglong Conference to get peace accord (third step of the roadmap) could not be held every six 
months as planned. It has been delayed and postponed several times. There should be dialogue 
between political authorities and the security sector leadership on a regular basis and continuous 
interaction, which has not been realized. To sign the union peace agreement (fourth step of the 
roadmap) is also strenuous in practice. While Tatmadaw sees DDR as the core to the peace process 
and still gives priority to protecting the 2008 Constitution, the ethnic groups prioritize a proper 
SSR. For ethnic nationalities, national security should be framed as efforts to protect and secure the 
political, economic, social, civil rights and cultural rights of the people.  It requires the 
government’s supreme tact to cater all the stakeholders, including the Tatmadaw, to find points of 
compromise in order to reach the union peace agreement. This will mean to amend the 2008 
Constitution which is preventing civilian supremacy in Burma/Myanmar.  
Conclusion  
        The military junta has guardedly initiated the transition through a new constitution 
which safeguarded their guardianship political role. This carefully-planned constitution-
making process itself is the military junta’s “power sharing strategy” to keep its political 
significance in the post-junta system. The 2008 Constitution preserved the legal 
instruments that enabled the Tatmadaw to intervene as a “guardian” in the political arena. 
By initiating a “well-thought-out”, “caretaking”, and “pacted” transition since 2011, the 
Tatmadaw has been always targeting to have a dual role for the military in politics and 
defense.23 
        The current government held the 21st Panglong Conference as its third step of the 
seven-step roadmap. However, ethnic nationalities have serious concern whether 
Tatmadaw and the government have been collaborating in peace process approach. The 
clear confronting point is that Tatmadaw strictly holds on to 2008 constitution while NLD 
sets up in its fifth step of the roadmap constitutional amendment in accordance with the 
union agreement and its approval. It is alarming now that peace process will reach a 
                                                          
21 Gronberg, Helena. "Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) in 
Myanmar." PRSG Peacebuilding Reintegration Stabilization Group. 2016. https://cve-
initiative.org/2016/04/01/disarmament-demobilization-and-reintegration-ddr-and-security-sector-reform-ssr-in-
myanmar/.  
22 Kyed, Helene Maria, and Mikael Gravers. "Integration and Power-Sharing: What Are the Future Options for Armed 
Non-State Actors in the Myanmar Peace Process?" Stability: International Journal of Security and Development 4, no. 
1 (January/February, 2015). doi:10.1075/ps.5.3.02chi.audio.2f. 
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deadlock if conflicts remain unresolved. Hence, one of the chief policy or governance 
purpose of SSR in Burma/Myanmar is to go beyond the traditional notion of national 
sovereignty and national security in the country. It remains to be seen how big a political 
space the government, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi as a figurehead of the movement, 
will be able to work effectively towards the change.  
        In the era of NLD government, to hold the multi-party democracy general elections 
in accordance with the amended and approved constitution as the sixth step, is still just a 
proposal. To be able to do so, Burma/Myanmar is indigent in terms of having more 
inclusive and nationally focused political parties along with ethno-regional based parties 
which already exist. In Burma/Myanmar, there are no strong and stable enough opposition 
political parties, especially representing the ethnic nationalities, and the political parties 
are still struggling to play these admittedly idealized roles. Burma/Myanmar needs to 
build political parties as institution that can collectively solve problems and deliver 
credible commitments. Without the dynamic participation of national and ethnic-regional 
based political parties, negotiation among the government, Tatmadaw, and NCA 
signatories EAOs will not be able to solve the long-lasting conflict in the country. Hence, 
inclusive participation of well-informed stakeholders in the Union Peace Conference (third 
step) to be able to sign Union Peace Accord (fourth step) can channel to the sixth step of 
the roadmap.  
        Therefore, there are three crucial issues to reach to the final step  of NLD’s roadmap. 
The first is to get a political guarantee which affirms democracy and federal union state is 
under the negotiation process through ceasefire agreements and peace conferences. 
Second, until or unless the Tatmadaw is willing to take national security under civilian 
supremacy, the peace process still will be futile. Ethnic armed conflict will be put to an 
end once the political guarantee is implemented in accordance with democratic principles 
which assure civilian supremacy. Hence, the polit ical will of Tatmadaw can help to reach 
up to the fourth step of the seven-step roadmap. Is it possible to amend the 2008 
Constitution? Even if 75% of all the representatives of Pyidaungsu Hluttaw have agreed to 
amend, 25% of the seats in Pyithu Hluttaw and Amyotha Hluttaw respectively, are 
reserved for the Tatmadaw.24 The constitution amendment procedure is depending on the 
good political will of the Tatmadaw. 25 Now is the golden chance for Tatmadaw to save the 
legacy it has lost sixty years ago, and to build trust and love from the people. Smooth 
procedure of step one to five of the roadmap will guarantee the last two steps, which are to 
hold the multi-party democracy general elections in accordance with the amended and 
approved constitution, and to build a democratic federal union in accordance with the 
results of the multi-party democracy general elections. 
                                                          
24 Article109 (a) and (b), 141 (a) and (b), Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008) 
25 Article 20 (f), Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008) 
